



It's (DOM) Clobbering Time: Attack Techniques, Prevalence, and Defenses

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DOM Clobbering






Code-less markup injection attack



Markup id/name collides with sensitive variables or APIs, and overwrites them



Problem Statement

- Limited knowledge about DOM Clobbering
 - First instance in 2010 affecting frame-busting code

Application code

top.location = self.location



Attack markup (injection)

<iframe name=**self** src="**evil.com**">

Q: What other attack markups will work?



</>

Many combinations of tags, attributes, code features, and browser behaviours unexplored



No automatic detection technique or tool, and prevalence is unknown

<u>`@</u>`

Recent DOM Clobbering vulnerabilities in popular sites¹ question the efficacy of defenses

RQ1: Clobbering Markups and Browser Behaviours


RQ2: Vulnerability Detection and Prevalence

RQ3: Defenses and their Effectiveness




RQ1: Clobbering Markups






24M test cases, 19 browsers (mobile and desktop), cover all tags, attributes, relations and targets

• Test clobbering of variable X, object property X.Y, and built-in APIs



RQ1: Clobbering Markups





RQ1: Clobbering Markups – Online Demo




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RQ2: Vulnerability Detection – TheThing (JAW v2.x)

- Proposed an open source, static-dynamic tool for detecting DOM Clobbering at scale
- Components
 - Data Collection
 - Vulnerability Analysis
 - Vulnerability Verification



https://ja-w.me






RQ2: Vulnerability Prevalence



• Empirical study to quantify the prevalence of DOM clobbering in the wild



🛢 Testbed


Tranco top 5K websites, 205.6K webpages, 18.3M scripts, 24.6B LoC

Results

- Detected 9,467 clobberable data flows across 491 affected sites
- Exploits for 44 websites (all confirmed and patched):
 - E.g., GitHub, Trello, Vimeo, Fandom, WikiBooks and VK
 - Client-side XSS, open redirections and request forgery attacks

RQ3: Defenses and their Effectiveness





- Including popular ones like DOMPurify, Mozilla Bleach, and Google Caja
- 13 of them also vulnerable in most strict config



- The other 13 sanitizers always remove named properties
- Including cases that do not lead to DOM Clobbering (e.g.,)

RQ3: Defenses and their Effectiveness



Mitigations

HTML Sanitization Namespace Isolation

Content Security Policy DOM Object Freezing

See paper for more mitigations ...

Alternative: prefix/isolate named properties instead of removing them

- (+) mitigates almost all DOM Clobbering cases
- (-) may require some implementation changes by developers



Contribution: implemented namespace isolation in DOMPurify

• Use the new SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS config



RQ3: Defenses and their Effectiveness



Mitigations

HTML Sanitization Namespace Isolation Content Security Policy DOM Object Freezing



Disabling DOM Clobbering


Infeasible

Solution: disable named properties at browser-level?¹

- (+) fixes all DOM Clobbering cases
- (-) can cause breakage

Measurement

Cost: 13.3% of webpages use named properties and will break (~51% of sites) **Benefit:** fixes the 491 vulnerable sites (i.e., 9.8% of top 5K sites)



breakage-benefit balance: ratio of ~5:1

Proposal to W3C: Opt-in CSP/feature policy flag to allow developers to disable name properties



¹Source: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/issues/349

RQ3: Vulnerable Patterns and Guidelines



• Identified eight common vulnerable code patterns in the wild

Z Patterns



#1: Explicit Variable Declarations

var VAR1 = `string';

#2: Strict Type Checking

If(!API instanceof HTMLElement)

#3: Do Not Use Document for Globals

const VAR1 = `string';

Α

В

С

var VAR2 = window.VAR1 || CONST; SINK(VAR2);

832 webpages

1,214 webpages

```
var VAR2 = [windoc.]API || CONST;
SINK(VAR2);
```

655 webpages

```
[document.VAR1 = CONST];
```

```
SINK(document.VAR1 || CONST);
```


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RQ3: Vulnerable Patterns and Guidelines



• Identified eight common vulnerable code patterns in the wild

See paper for more! # **Code Pattern** var VAR2 = window.VAR1 || CONST; ASINK (VAR2) ; var VAR2 = [WinDoc.]BA || CONST; BSINK (VAR2) ; [document.VAR1 = CONST]; CSINK (document. VAR1 || CONST); let VAR1 = VAR2 = CONST; D SINK (window. VAR1 || CONST); SINK (window. VAR1 || CONST); EVAR1 = CONST; STNK /



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Conclusion

Thank You!

- Clobbering markups come in many forms (i.e., **31.4K** variants)
- DOM Clobbering is ubiquitous in the wild (i.e., **9.8%** of sites)
- Existing defenses helpful but may not completely cut it







